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NOTES
PHYSICAL AND MENTAL CONDITION AS A DEFENSE IN BREACH OF PROMIsE-Fame and notoriety attach to the Anglo-American law for many reasons,
and among these is the action for breach of promise.' While it exists in other
legal systems, its development has been retarded by one means or another and
nowhere does it match the lusty 300 year old 2 growth of our own system. But,
though the legislative mills may grind even more slowly than those of the gods,
there is evidence that a colorful history is drawing to a close. Although various
bills directed at complete abolition of the action failed to reach a second reading
in the House of Commons, an attempt to limit action to recovery for actual pecuniary loss passed the Commons in 1879, but died in the House of Lords.3 That
the inertia of the House of Lords was not an index of contemporary opinion is
evident from the flood of articles and comments before and since that time,
dealing with one or another phase of the action, and almost invariably expressing4
adverse criticism and hope for its reform or total excision from the legal system.
The clamor has not been unheard and legislative activity in response to the
stimulus is rapidly awakening. 5
Such a radical step as complete eradication of the action is, of course, a
peculiarly legislative task, but judicial sensitivity to changing socio-economic conditions and popular sentiment has been known in the past to change the path of
the law without- legislative prodding. Consequently, in jurisdictions where the
legislature is more deliberate, it would not be altogether surprising to find courts
responding to current opinion by impairing the adhesive properties of the action
for breach of promise as a mender of broken hearts with the familiar process of
"interpretation" of the existing law."
One of the methods by which this could be done would be the strengthening
of the defensive armament permitted in an action for breach of promise. It is
the purpose of this note to examine to what extent the courts have invoked the
aid of this device in respect to a particular defense, that of change in the physical
or mental condition of the parties after the exchange of mutual promises. It is
evident at once that not every illness can afford a complete defense, and that the
results in the cases may differ with various types of illness. It would seem also
that unless there is substantial unanimity as to the considerations affecting a
determination of the question, the results might be expected to vary widely. As
a matter of fact they do not, but there are variations in the theories upon which
liability is predicated or refused. An examination of the cases will indicate the
extant confusion as to the nature and aims of marriage, and the necessity for the
adoption of one or another ratio decidendi to give commendable direction to the
law in this field, and to enable the courts to cope with changing conditions in the
light of modern scientific knowledge.
I. For a list of those countries whose law is marked by the absence of the action or
which have only a modified form of it, see Wright, The Action for Breach of Promise, IO
VA. L. REV. 361 (1924).
2. White, Breach of Promise of Marriage, io L. Q. REv. 135 (1894).
3. Wright, supra note i at 383.
4. See, ,for example, Schouler, Breach of Promise, 7 So. LAw Rav. (N. s.) 57 (1887);
Wright, supra note i; Brown, Breach of Promise Suits, 77 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 474 (1929) at
49o et seq.; 25 LAW Nors 223 (1922); 67 SOL. L. J. 41 (922).
5. TIm, April I, 1935, at 15; Phila. Evening Ledger, Feb. 5, 1935, at 3.

6. Thus the action, at its birth and, at least theoretically, now available to male and
female alike, (White, supra note 2 at 135, 136) is at present practically a weapon only for
the woman. But see Kelly v. Renfro, 9 Ala. 325, 328 (1846).
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The major dichotomy in the field is between those cases adopting the theory
that marriage is a contract pure and simple, and those which recognize that the
analogy between the marriage contract and an ordinary commercial contract is
far from perfect. England and New Jersey are the only jurisdictions adhering
to the contract view. A dictum in an early English case 7 indicated that a change
in the health of the parties after the promise would be a good ground for terminating the contract, but the question was not presented squarely for decision until
i858 when the leading case of Hall v. Wright8 reached the Queen's Bench. In
reply to the plaintiff's action for breach of promise, the defendant alleged that
he had become afflicted with a disease causing bleeding from the lungs and that
marriage would endanger his life. The Court divided equally. The case thereupon went to the Exchequer Chamber 9 where the court divided four to three in
favor of the plaintiff. Each of the judges wrote an opinion and only by Pollock,
C. B., and Bramwell, B., was it suggested that a contract of marriage was perhaps
not to be treated on the same footing as the sale of a cow. 0 But the learned
judges were not content to rely on such a tenuous ground and, like the rest of
the court, whether they voted for the plaintiff or for the defendant, reasoned
chiefly from contract principles. The defendant had regarded his disease as a
supervening impossibility excusing him from performance, and the division of
opinion resulted not from any fundamental difference ir point of view as to the
nature of marriage as a legal relationship, but from a lack of unanimity as to
what principles of contract law applied 1 or in the applicability to the facts of a
particular principle agreed upon. The judges differed, for example, as to
whether inability to consummate marriage without danger to life was supervening impossibility or whether only such disease as prevented the defendant
from going through the ceremony was a supervening impossibility.12 In keeping
with the general standpoint from which the court viewed the question, except
for the intimation that there would be a sufficient defense if the illness was such
as to prevent the defendant from going through the ceremony,' 3 no distinctions
were drawn on the basis of the type of the disease. As we shall see later, the
American courts are diametrically opposed to this point of view.' 4 Compelled
by the logic of its approach, neither did the court consider the effect of the disease
on possible offspring or the public.
However, there are indications in a later case 15 that the English courts now
realize that the health of the parties to a marriage is a matter of moment not
only to themselves, but also to the public, and therefore that defendant's supervening disease might be a defense if it were of such a nature as to produce
delinquent or degenerate children.'
7. Atchinson v. Baker, 2 Peake's N. P. 1o3 (K. B. 1796) at io4.
8. El. B. & E. 746 (1858).
q. El. B. & E. 765 (i859).
Io. Id. at 779, 795.
ii. Thus in the Queen's Bench the opinion of Erle, J. would seem to turn upon the
ground that the contract was to be performed within a reasonable time and the health of
the defendant was a factor in deciding what constituted a reasonable time. Wightman, J.
considered that the contract was avoided if it could not be fulfilled without great danger
to defendant. Campbell, C. J., held that there was no supervening impossibility since defendant could go through the ceremony of marriage. In the Exchequer Chamber, Watson,
B. found implied conditions in the contract that the parties remain in health; while Williams, J. thought that plaintiff, not being the defaulting party, had the choice of enforcing
or waiving the contract.
12. Cf. the opinions of Bramwell, B., Watson, B., and Crowder, J.
X3. Ibd.
14. Infra p. iooo.
i5. Gamble v. Sales, 36 T. L. R. 427 (i92o).
i6. There are remarks in this case which may furnish ground for believing that the
court would not hold defendant liable if the disease was such that marriage would endanger
his life. But the court took no definite stand.
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Another limitation upon the doctrine of Hall v. Wright has been suggested
by the case of Jefferson v. Paskell,17 where it was said that the defense of change
in physical condition after the promise to marry would be a good defense if the
change occurred in the plaintiff. But the court recognized that not every illness
in the plaintiff will justify the defendant in refusing to perform. Also, it is to
be noted that the opinion involves no marked alteration in the court's attitude.
Marriage is still regarded as a contract and the change in the physical condition
of the plaintiff is a defense for the same reason that a defendant is not liable for
breach of a contract to buy perfect goods when the goods tendered are imperfect.'8
In the only other jurisdiction adhering to the contract view, the vacillation
and doubt characterizing Hall v. Wright is not present. With complete singlemindedness the New Jersey court decided, in the only case before it involving
the point, that the fact that defendant became afflicted with a disease which would
be aggravated by intercourse was no defense to an action for breach of promise
to marry. The court followed the lead of Hall v. Wright, approving the charge
of the lower court which was in these words:
"Contracts the performance of which involves imminent hazard to life
are not infrequent; no one would think of excusing a locomotive engineer
or the captain of a ship from the performance of his duty-because of an
unexpected danger to his life in the performance."
To this, the upper court added:
"If a party enter into an absolute contract, without any qualification or
exception, he must abide by the contract, and either do the act or pay the
damages."
Further:
. . . impossibility to perform will alone constitute an absolute bar."
In the majority of American jurisdictions, however, although there is occasional talk of implied conditions precedent that the parties remain in good
health,2 0 or that there is a failure of consideration if plaintiff is unable to engage
in intercourse,2 the contract aspect of marriage is not emphasized and contract
rules do not control the results. Because the American courts have refused to
follow the English contract view that only such illness as prevents participation
in the ceremony is sufficient impossibility to render defendant immune to suit,
and because it is apparent that not every illness will justify breach and that a
line must be drawn somewhere, greater stress is placed in these decisions on the
nature of the disease causing defendant to breach. The cases may be classified
on this basis.
In the landmark case of In re Estate of Oldfield,"1 it is said that the disease
accruing to the defendant after the promise is a defense (i) where the disease
x K. B. 57.
i8. Travis v. Schnebly, 68 Wash. 1, 122 Pac. 316 (1912). This tendency to look at
marriage purely as a contract may result, perhaps, from the greater emphasis laid upon the
economic aspects of marriage in Europe. EVERsLEY, DomEsTic RELAmTIONs (4th ed. 1926)
17. [i916]

78.

See Note (1924)

20

IOwA L. BU.T. 68 at 72.

But in Continental countries this phase

of the marriage relationship receives even greater consideration and yet not only do the
courts not treat the matter as a contract, but in many countries there is no action at all.
See Wright, supra note i.
I9. Smith v. Compton, 67 N. J. L. 548, at 55i, 554, 52 Atl. 386, at 386, 387 (i9o2).
2o. Shackleford v. Hamilton, 93 Ky. 8o, at 88, i9 S. W. 5, at 7 (I89) ; Sanders v.
Coleman, 97 Va. 69o, 694, 34 S. E. 621, 622 (i899).
21. Gring v. Lerch, 112 Pa. 244, 250, 3 Atl. 841, 843 (1886).
22. 175 Iowa ii8, 156 N. W. 977 (i916).
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is a loathsome one transmissible to wife and offspring; 23 or (2) where the
disease is such that intercourse would hasten death; or (3) where the disease is
such that the afflicted party has only a short time to live. While much of the
(in
opinion was obiter, the diseases involved in many of the American cases
24
which defendant has been upheld) fall into one or the other classification.
It cannot be said, however, that the Iowa classification represents the general
American opinion because in no one state have cases arisen involving all three
categories, and in only one case has the court of a state other than Iowa indicated
25
that it looks with favor upon the Iowa rules as governing the whole field.
Moreover, there are some cases in which the disease was not within any one of
the three
classes set forth, but in which the defendant was nevertheless not held
28
liable.

This attitude is a wise one because, liberal as the Iowa approach is when
compared to the English or New Jersey contract view, it has serious defects.
In the first place, the subject matter is one peculiarly unsuited to decision by
rules of thumb. Secondly, while the English philosophy which regards marriage
largely from the aspects of property and social standing does not prevail in the
United States, the Iowa rules lean too heavily upon the idea that intercourse is
the end and aim of marriage.?7 Consequently, mental and nervous diseases,
offering no hindrance to intercourse, afford no defense, 28 although they may be
quite as serious,
from a societal or personal view, as pernicious anemia or
29
tuberculosis.
Likewise, latent hereditary traits are entirely overlooked by this view, and
that they must be taken into account is indicated by modem scientific studies.
While the particular party may be healthy, we know now that the offspring may
not be, and since the marriage would, from both a public and personal viewpoint,
23. It is not clear whether the disease must be such that it is certain to be communicated to wife and offspring, or whether a possibility is sufficient for the defense. In many
cases where defendant was not held liable there was no evidence as to the disease beyond
its loathsome character. See cases cited note 24 infra.
24. Cases of the first class are: Shacideford v. Hamilton, 93 Ky. 80, 19 S. W. 5 (1892);
Trammell v. Vaughan, 158 Mo. 214, 59 S. W. 79 (i9oo); Allen v. Baker, 86 N. C. 9I
(1882) ; cf. Gardner v. Arrett, 5o S. W. 84o (Ky. 1899). Cases of the second class are:
Sanders v. Coleman, 97 Va. 690, 34 S. E. 621 (1899) ; Grover v. Zook, 44 Wash. 489, 87
Pac. 638 (19o6). Only one case has been found the evidence in which placed it clearly and
indubitably in the third class, namely, In re Estate of Oldfield, 175 Iowa I1S,156 N. W.
977 (ii6). Under this treatment of the cases, it is immaterial whether plaintiff or defendant has the disease. See cases cited supra this footnote.
25. Shepler v. Chamberlain, 226 Mich. 112, 197 N. W. 372 (1924).
The statement is
dictum since the facts of the case brought it within none of the Iowa categories.
26. Edmonds v. Hughes, 115 Ky. 561, 74 S. W. 283 (9o3) (inability to bear children);
Parks v. Marshall, 322 Mo. 218, 14 S. W. (2d) 590 (0929) (feeble-mindednes in defendant; there was some evidence that plaintiff knew of the defect, but this was not material
to the decision as the court saw the question) ; Gring v. Lerch, 112 Pa. 244, 3 Atl. 841
(1886) (malformation in plaintiff preventing intercourse); Travis v. Schnebly, 68 Wash.
1, 122 Pac. 316 (1Q12)
(plaintiff had a "floating kidney"); cf. Witt v. Heyen, 114 Kan.
86%, 221 Pac. 262 Q923) (decided under a statute) ; Mac~illan v. Carlton, 121 Kan. 797,
250 Pac. 308 (1926).
27. See the dissenting opinion of Salinger, J. in In re Estate of Oldfield, 175 Iowa iS,
at 155, 156 N. W. 977, at 989 (ii6).
This attitude of the courts is revealed in other ways.
Thus impotency is ground for annulment. I VERNI=R, AmEmrCAN FAreuy LAws (1932) 241.
But sterility is not.
28. But if plaintiff is so afflicted it would seem defendant would not be liable on ordinary contract principles.
29. Of course, if our psychiatrical and neurological "knowledge" is at all accurate, such
indifference to mental and nervous diseases is justifiable since all of us are supposed to be
affected to a greater or less degree and a party has no right to demand perfection in either
himself or his spouse.
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be a failure, it seems that such hereditary family traits should afford a defense.
They do not under the Iowa view.30
This, then, is the state of the law at present, but the results achieved and
their unsatisfactory nature depend to such a large degree upon the various lines
of reasoning employed to reach them, that a closer scrutiny of the grounds of
decision is incumbent. Such an examination may illuminate the defects and
inconsistencies of the theories and furnish light for the formulation of a single
standard applicable to all the cases and more desirable from a social point of view
than those now existing.
While the English contract view has been expressly or impliedly repudiated
in the United States, intimations of its influence are sufficiently discernible in
the cases to warrant discussion of this theory of liability or non-liability. 31 Of
course, if the courts are unwilling to minimize the deleterious effects of the
action by strengthening the defenses, and if they refuse to distinguish marriage
from ordinary commercial contracts, this theory is properly applicable. It may
be used as a defense when plaintiff is diseased but not where defendant is,32
unless the disease is such as to amount to supervening impossibility. But even
granting that this is a logical use of the theory in practice, it still leaves open
the question of the nature of the plaintiff's disease which will excuse defendant
from performance. Not every disease should be a defense if the action is to be
retained at all and the contract theory followed.33
Furthermore, when defendant has the disease the contract theory has proven
to be the most uncertain in its application.3 4 The essence of the defense is
supervening impossibility and the courts have not been able to agree on what
constitutes such impossibility. In England and New Jersey there is no impossibility if the defendant is physically able to go through the ceremony; while
those American cases in which echoes of the contract theory are heard, say that
there is impossibility excusing the defendant if he is unable, by reason of his
condition, to consummate marriage.36
In addition, the theory is defective purely from the point of view of efficiency. Its indirect result is to add to the burden of the divorce courts in this
wise. Suppose, for example, that the prospective husband is afflicted with a
disease which intercourse will aggravate to such an extent as to endanger his
life. Under the contract view he must marry or pay damages-so he will probably marry. Thereupon, fearing for his life, he refuses to have intercourse or
30. It is notable that the few cases involving such deficiencies or mental diseases are
comparatively recent or decided under statutes. See Witt v. Heyen, 114 Kan. 869, 221
Pac. 262 (1923); Parks v. Marshall, 322 Mo. 218, 14 S. W. (2d) 590 (1929).
31. It has been suggested that the basic fallacy of the action for breach of promise is
that it assumes an enforceable promise when, in fact, there is none. Wright, supra note I;
Note (1925) 25 CoL. L. REv. 343 (in which the argument is also answered). If this contention has any merit, there is no need of the proposed statutory abolition of the action, nor
is there any justification for the Iowa classification. But that the courts regard such a promise as enforceable is too well settled at this late date to permit of question.
32. See the dissenting opinion in In re Estate of Oldfield, 175 Iowa 118, 156 N. W. 977
(igi6). But cf. Baker v. Cartwright, io C. B. (N. s.) 124 (1867).
33. The court in a situation where the contract theory is properly applicable might
fall back upon some such classification as was adopted by the Iowa court. But strictly
speaking this would violate contract principles since defendant did not contract for damaged goods.
34. See the division of opinion in Hall v. Wright, set forth in note ii supra, though each
judge purported to consider the question solely in the light of contract law.
35. Smith v. Compton, 67 N. J. L. 548, 52 Atl. 386 (ios) ; Hall v. Wright, El. B. & E.

765 (1859).

36. See Shackleford v. Hamilton, 93 Ky. 80, ig S. W. 5 (1892); Allen v. Baker, 86
N. C. 91 (1882) ; Sanders v. Coleman, 97 Va. 69o, 34 S. E. 621 (18g9).
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live with his wife and she sues for divorce.3 7 Had the law been that the husband's disease was a defense, there would have been no breach of promise action,
no marriage, no suit for divorce, none of the loss of time, effort and money and,
more important, none of the harmful effects upon the emotional and nervous
systems of the parties which follow as a result of the present law. And even if
the disease is not such as to induce the husband to refrain from intercourse and
give the wife cause for divorce, it is quite likely that a divorce will ensue on
manufactured grounds if the man married solely because he feared an action
for breach of promise, or if the woman was of the type which usually employs
such a weapon.
The chief objection to the contract view, however, is that the action is not
in truth a contract action at all. Neither is it a tort action. It contains elements
of both 3 and the reasoning used in either tort or contract actions has no application here-and this is particularly true because of its subject matter. In view
of these strictures it is fortunate that, though American courts may occasionally
speak as though they considered the action on the same ground as an action
for breach of contract, the results show that they do not. The contract theory
is definitely a minority view and it is doubtful if even the English courts would
follow it today.3 9
More prominent in the American cases is the attitude that the validity 6f
the defense is to be determined from the point of view of "public policy"; that
if the disease, regardless of whether it is in plaintiff or defendant, is such as to
result in abnormal or subnormal offspring, the defendant is justified in refusing
to perform.4 0

The clich6 is that the state has an interest in marriage, 41 or that

the state is a third party to the marriage, 42 and that its welfare is the primary
consideration in determining if defendant's refusal to perform ought to be
compensable. Evidently, repetition has given the dogma a hollow sound because
there are only two cases which go squarely upon this ground. 43 Certainly, the
state's interest is more evident after the marriage has been set up than when the
parties have merely agreed to set up in the future a status in which the state
purportedly has an interest. That the courts realize this and lean lightly upon
the doctrine in the type of case under consideration is apparent from the actual
results even where judicial decision is verbally shot through with the usual language. For example, it would seem that if the state's interest is the controlling
consideration, the fact of plaintiff's or defendant's knowledge of the existence
of the disease in one or the other of them at the time of the making of the
37. In many states, this would be ground for dissolution. See 2 VERNIM, AmERIcAw
66 et seq.
38. Brown, s=pra note 4.
39. POLLOCK, PRINCIPLFS OF CONTRACT (9th ed. I921) 319.
40. Shackleford v. Hamilton, 93 Iy. 8o, I9 S. W. 5 (1892); Parks v. Marshall, 322 Mo.

FAMILY LAWS (1932) 36, n. I,

218, 14 S. W. (2d) 590 (1929) ; Allen v. Baker, 86 N. C. 91 (188) ; Gulick v. Gulick,
41 N. J. L. I3 (1878) ; Grover v. Zook, 44 Wash. 489, 87 Pac. 638 (I906).
41. Parks v. Marshall and Grover v. Zook, both supra note 4o.
42. Trammel v. Vaughan, i58 Mo. 214 at 222, 59 S. W. 79 at 8i (i9oo).

43. Parks v. Marshall and Grover v. Zook, both supra note 40.
44. Cases in which the public policy argument was expressly set out and in which the
court disregards the factor of knowledge are: Gulick v. Gulick, 41 N. J. L. 13 (1878);
Parks v. Marshall, 32-- Mo. 218, 14 S. W. (2d) 596 (i929); Grover v. Zook, 44 Wash.
489, 87 Pac. 638 (i9o6). In Gardner v. Arnett, 50 S. W. 840 (Ky. x899) there was slight
mention of the interest of society in marriage and evidence as to the knowledge of the parties was not considered. In Simmons v. Simmons, 8 Mich. 318 (i86o), one of the grounds
on which the defendant was held liable was his knowledge of plaintiff's deficiencies. There
was no reference to "public policy". Accord: Lemke v. Franzenburg, I59 Iowa 466, 141
See
N. W. 332 (1913); cf. Goodner v. Goodner, 147 Tenn. 517, 249 S. W. 805 (923).
Vierling v. Binder, 113 Iowa 337, 339, 85 N. W. 621, 62z (igoi).
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promise should be immaterial, and yet the result varies with the presence or
absence of this factor. 4 4 Furthermore, it would seem that the interests of the
state, if only from the point of view of enforcing adherence to the mores, and
social control generally, dictates more numerous and comprehensive categories
than those laid down by the Iowa courts and generally followed in the United
States.
But even conceding that a court means what it says and that the interest
of the public is the determinative factor in these cases, this seemingly enlightened and far-sighted method of deciding the question has its deficiencies. In
the first place, in just what phases of the family the state is interested and just
how a particular disease will affect the family unit is not always clear. Secondly,
public policy is too often a loophole by which a court slips out of difficult situations, or it furnishes a cloak giving the appearance of high-minded thinking to
what is, in essence, abdominal jurisprudence adding nothing to legal certainty.
More specific criticisms of the method arise when concrete fact situations
are presented. Thus, can plaintiff recover damages if defendant, having broken
his contract because he became afflicted with a disease which, from the point of
view of "public policy" justifies his refusal to perform, subsequently recovers
his health? 45 There are no cases on point. Neither do the decided cases which
purport to be governed by "public policy" and the interest of the state furnish
any clue to the rule in cases where an unhealthy party breaches, the parties being
of such an 4age
that consiommation and children were either not contemplated or
6
impossible.
It may be conceded for the moment that these are not serious faults in the
method and that the character and extent of diseases which condone breach can
be adequately ascertained from the point of view of the state's interest. But
quwre whether the interest of the state would not be better served by refusing to
go deeper into the case than finding whether there has been a material change 47 in
the physical or mental condition of the parties or a discovery of some such
deficiency in the family of one or both of the parties in such a degree as to have
caused one of the parties in good faith to regard the proposed union as an undesirable one. Such a test removes the marriage relationship from the plane of
commercial contracts, and properly widens the concept of the public interest
therein to include more than the health of the parties or children, 8 and yet does
not invade the legislative province and completely abolish the action for breach
of promise.
Of course, resolution of the cases by such means requires a complete reorientation of the philosophy of the courts in regard to the marriage status. It
necessitates a realization that the end and aim of marriage is not solely inter45. According to the REsTATmENr, CoNTracrs (1932) § 462, the defendant could be
held to performance upon his recovery, but since this would require treatment of the case
by the same rules as are applied to a commercial contract there may be some doubt as to
whether the courts would so hold.
46. In one such case the defendant was held liable, but the court did not purport to follow
the "public policy" view.

Goodner v. Goodner, 147 Tenn. 517, 249 S. W. 805 (1923).

Cf.

the rule denying an annulment when the parties are of advanced age and it is asked on
the ground of impotency. Hatch v. Hatch, 58 Misc. 54, 11o N. Y. Supp. i8 (19o8).
47. Such a test is open to the criticism that it is too uncertain, but the question would
be one for the jury with no more uncertainty than attaches to a determination of what
is negligence.
48. Where the parties are forced into marriage under such circumstances, the probabilities are against the establishment of desirable home conditions; there is likely to be continuous tension and friction finally resulting in breach. The deleterious effect of the broken
family pattern on rates of child delinquency (leaving out of consideration for the moment
the effect on the spouses themselves) is now well established. See GLuECK, ONE THouSAND JuvENILE DELINQUENTS (1934) at pp. 73, 75, 76.
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course or reproduction, 49 and that outside the law courts, marriage has more
than merely economic phases.50 Supposed to be congenitally unsentimental,
courts should nevertheless have no difficulty in assimilating the idea that the
state's interest in marriage is best served not by attempting to procure mere
marriages, but to procure marriages not torn and twisted by internal conflict.
However, to date, few cases have been influenced by such thought and those
which have usually employ as well more familiar reasoning to support their
decision."1
But should the courts find the change too great a wrench from the
traditional ideology, the advantages of the method of treatment outlined can be
secured within the established boundaries. Those courts clinging to the contract view, when deciding whether or not defendant is liable for breaking a
contract to marry by reason of his or plaintiff's physical or mental condition
might, merely by deciding that the contract calls for the creation of a successful
marriage so far as that is within the power of the parties, decide the cases as
enlightened policy dictates without doing violence to the past. 2 Likewise the
rigid categories of the Iowa rules can be extended as we learn more about the
interrelation of physical, mental and nervous conditions and their effect on social
relationships. And the present gap between the law and existing customs and
opinions need never occur again because a rule of law whose operation depends
on the end and aim of marriage will be sufficiently flexible to respond to popular
opinion on the subject.
On the other hand, it may very well be argued that the theory that the courts
should aim primarily at procuring only successful marriages may lead to a
practical abolition of the breach of promise action without resort to the legislative
process. If the defendant can escape liability for breach of his promise when
the health of the parties has so changed that this purpose cannot be achieved,
the next logical step seems to be that a change in the affection of the parties is
sufficient ground for refusing performance 5 3 and that gullible women will have
no protection against masculine wiles. But there seems good reason to doubt
whether women need such protection and whether the women who actually suffer
from breach of promise are benefited by the action. 54 All in all, that the lack of
love between the parties will become a defense would not seem to be calamitous,
except for two reasons: (i) that the courts might, as has been suggested, thus
permit the abolition of the action and so act legislatively, and (2) that love has
so little to do with the action for breach of promise 55 that lack of it should be
no defense.
A.W.

49. Cf. the opinion of Bramwell, B., in Hall v. Wright, El. B. & E. 765 (1859); In re

Estate of Oldfield, 175 Iowa 118, 156 N. W. 977 (1916) ; Gring v. Lerch, 12 Pa. 244 at 250,

3 Atl. 841 at 843 (1886). See also the dissenting opinion of Salinger, J., in In re Estate of
Oldfield, supra.
50. See the opinion of Martin, B., in Hall v. Wright, El. B. & E. 765 at 787 (1859).
51. Sanders v. Coleman, 97 Va. 69o, 34 S. E. 621 (1899).
52. The division of opinion in Hall v. Wright, the leading case expounding the contract view, resulted because the judges were not sure what the contract called for. Therefore, it would probably put no great strain on the principle of stare decisis for the court to
decide what constitutes performance of such a contract and to decide that the obligation
of the parties is that set out in the text.
53. 82 CFaxT. L. J. 297 (1916).
54. Wrr , supra note 2 at p. 141.

55. Ibid., quoting Mr. Justice Mathew. See also Willes, J., in Hall v. Wright, El. B.
& E. 765 at 786 (1859).
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RESIGNATION BY DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF PRIVATE CORPORIATIONS 1
-Webster defines "resignation" as the act of retiring or withdrawing formally

from a position or office. This note will deal with the voluntary withdrawal of
individuals from their positions as directors or officers 2 in private corporations.
The term "private corporation" as used here is meant to be distinguished only
from "municipal corporation," and is intended to include all other corporate
organizations whether publicly or privately organized and administered, and
whether their purposes be private gain or public benefit.
It should be noted at the outset that the facts constituting a "resignation"
may differ according to the type of controversy involved. When the question
at issue is the effectiveness of an attempt by a director to sever relations with
the corporation so as to render him immune from liability for subsequent mismanagement, courts may well be less sympathetic with the plea of resignation
than where, for example, the question is the effectiveness of the "resignation"
to qualify the director as a witness to a bequest to the corporation. Similarly,
if the defense to a claim for salary as a corporate officer is that the claimant
had "resigned" prior to the period of service in question, courts may describe
certain facts as a "resignation" which they would not necessarily so designate
if confronted with the contention that alleged service of process on a corporation
was ineffectual because the individual served had "resigned" as a corporate officer
prior to the service. The courts may not grant verbal recognition to such distinctions, but it seems that they will inevitably be influenced thereby. This note is not
primarily an attempt to analyze the case material in view of such differentiations;
it purports rather to set forth the typical manner in which courts have approached
the problems attendant upon resignation, and the requirements for a resignation
which have found judicial expression. In attempting to predict the reaction of a
court in a given case, however, such factors should be kept constantly in mind.
A corporate official may "resign" either by words or by acts. He may also
be "disqualified" by the doing of certain acts. In many instances, the two concepts, disqualification and resignation by acts (sometimes termed "abandonmeat"), are very similar factually and in legal consequence, and accordingly
have been treated by some textwriters 3 as one and the same thing. There are,
however, at least three factual distinctions to be made. First, a resignation implies
a severance of a relationship already created. A disqualification may also refer
to preventing the original creation of that relationship. Second, a resignation
necessarily deals with the volitional acts of the individual in question. A disqualification, though often involving volitional acts, also embraces forfeitures of
office arising from the happening of outside events not directly controlled by the
will of the disqualified person. Finally, resignation manifested by volitional acts
may be distinguished from disqualification by volitional acts. As regards the
latter the officer or director in question may continue or attempt to continue to act
as such officer or director although as a result of the disqualifying act he has
forfeited his right to the position. As regards the former, the act is normally
accompanied by a manifestation of intention that the corporate position be determined, the usual indication being a discontinuance of the duties attached to the
position. These distinctions may lead to different considerations and consequences. Resignation alone will be dealt with herein.
i. For other discussions of the problem, and a collection of the cases, see

2 THioMPsoN,

COR'ORATIrOS (3d ed. 1927) § 1188 et seq.; FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA COPORATINS (perm. ed.
1931) §345 et seq.; SPEI.LMAN, CORPORATE DIREcrORS (I93I) § III et seq.; (1930) 64 U. S.

L. REv.

351.

2. Generally, the officers of a corporation are enumerated in its charter or by-laws, and
include a president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer, and sometimes others.
3. For example, 2 THomPsoN, COPORATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 1193.

NOTES
i. The Priilege of Resigning
A. Acceptance by the Corporation
By accepting their appointment or election, officers and directors impliedly
agree to perform the duties incident to the office for the length of their term.
The duties are purely those of personal service. It is evident that the shareholders of the corporation would not desire the delicate functions which devolve
upon directors and officers to be performed by unwilling agents. Consequently
there has arisen the rule that under normal circumstances and in the absence of
statutory or corporate provision to the contrary, a director or officer may voluntarily sever his official relations with the corporation. 4 The reason in the rule is
strengthened in the case of the director by the added factor that he serves without
compensation and receives no technical consideration for his undertaking.
It would seem to follow from this premise that the privilege of resigning
should not be dependent on the consent or acceptance of the corporation either
through its shareholders or the board of directors. Nevertheless, though this
is the view commonly adopted, the courts both in the United States and in
England have deemed it necessary to reiterate it on a great number of occasions.5 This is due to the need for counteracting some of the earlier cases in
which the courts felt bound by the analogy to the English municipal corporation
cases, and required an acceptance by the corporation. 6 In England, a person
elected to public office, including office in municipal corporations, was obliged to
accept it and perform its duties, and subjected himself to a penalty by refusal.
An office was regarded as a burden which the appointee was bound, in the interest
of the community and of good government, to bear. From this it followed that
after an office had been conferred and assumed, it could not be abandoned
without the consent of the appointing power. This was required in order that
the public interests might suffer no inconvenience for want of public servants
to execute the laws.7 This idea is still prevalent in some jurisdictions in this
country,8 and is perhaps another reason why the modem courts have felt obliged
to repeat that acceptance is unnecessary to complete a resignation where a private
corporation is concerned. A third reason is the earlier belief that a director
was a trustee in the technical sense of that term- 9 Although often called a trustee, however, a director does not hold the legal title to the property in trust for
others. Directors are merely managers, while the corporation itself holds the
real and personal property necessary for carrying on its operations. Consequently, a director does not, like a trustee, have to gain consent of court or
4. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132 (1891); Movius v. Lee, 3o Fed. 298 (E. D.

N. Y. 1887) ; Fearing v. Glen, 73 Fed. 1i6 (C. C. A. 2d, 1896) ; Squires v. Brown, 22 How.
Pr. 35 (N. Y. I86O) ; Chandler v. Hoag, 2 Hun. 613 (N. Y. 1874) ; Nix v. Miller, 26 Colo.
203, 57 Pac. 1o84 (1899). This has been held to apply even though the director be one of the
first board of directors whose names have been inscribed in the articles of association as serving for the first year. Jackson v. Clifford, 5 D. C. App. (1895). One may sever his connection even though he is both an officer and a director, or even though he holds two corporate
positions. International Bank of St. Louis v. Faber, 86 Fed. 443 (C. C. A. 2d, 1898).
5. International Bank of St. Louis v. Faber, 86 Fed. 443 (C. C. A. 2d, 1898) ; In re Gloucester, 4 De G. M. & G. 769 (Eng. 1853) ; Finche v. Oakes, 73 L. T. R. 716 (Eng. 1896) ;
Nix v. Miller, 26 Colo. 203, 57 Pac. 1o84 (1899) ; Squires v. Brown, 22 How. Pr. 35 (N. Y.

186o) ; Sturges v. Vanderbilt, 73 N. Y. 384 (1878) ; Van Amburgh v. Baker, 81 N. Y. 46
(i88o); Noble v. Euler, 2o App. Div. 548, 47 N. Y. Supp. 302 (2d Deft 1897); Clark v.
Oceano Beach Co., io6 Cal. App. 574, 289 Pac. 946 (193o).
6. University of Md. v. Williams, 9 Gill & J. 365 (Md. 1838); State of Ohio v. Thomas
Bryce, 7 Ohio 414 (1836).
7. Rex v. Bower, I B. & C. 585 (Eng. 1823); Rex v. Larwood, 4 Mod. 270 (Eng. 1793).

8. People v. Williams, 145 Ill. 573 (1893); State v. Bd. of Education, io8 Kan. I1

(1920) ; Fryer v. Norton, 67 N. J. L. 23 (1903).

9. See Squires v. Brown, 22 How. Pr. 35, 44 (N. Y. i86o).
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cases
beneficiaries. Another reason for the repetition is the fact that in many
0
It does
there have been notations of the fact that the resignation was accepted.'
not appear in these cases whether the court thought that an acceptance was necessary to complete the resignation or whether it is mentioned merely by way of
proving the fact of prior resignation. Even if construed to have the former
meaning, however, they are at best weak dicta. There is only one modern case
which has definitely held that a resignation was not completed because not
accepted." In this case the issue was whether the defendant corporation was
bound by a covenant contained in a lease. Among numerous defenses, the corporation contended that the party who signed the lease had resigned prior to the
making of the contract in question. Having determined that the corporation was
bound because of ratifying the agreement, the court then threw out as another
reason for holding the corporation the single statement that the resignation had
not been accepted. The case seems of slight persuasiveness in view of the
numerous square holdings that acceptance is unnecessary to resignation.
Notwithstanding the fact that the director or officer has the privilege of
conresigning, and even though he may be removed for cause or by unanimous
12
sent of the shareholders, he cannot be compelled to tender a resignation.
B. Motive in Resigning
Although there is secondary authority to the effect that an individual's
motive is important as affecting tie right to resign,' 3 it would seem that motive
should have no legal effect other than by way of proving the fact of resignation.
The cases generally support this view.' 4 For example, the resignation has been
held operative even though effected in order to avoid service of process,' 5 or
liability arising out of negligence or other default in office.' 6 It is important in
the latter instance that although the resignation was complete, the liability previously created was not avoided. This matter will be treated more fully below.
Similarly, it may here be noted that though an agreement to resign for a consideration may be illegal, yet7 if the person employs the proper formalities, his
resignation will be effective.'
C. Effect of Provisionsin Statutes, Charters, or By-laws
It has already been noted that the privilege of resigning may be affected
by statutory or corporate provisions. Where, for example, a by-law specifically
provides that the effectiveness of a resignation is conditioned on acceptance,' 8
there is obviously no problem of interpretation. There are, however, three common types of statement which require interpretation. One, is the provision that
whenever a vacancy occurs by death, resignation, or the like, the board of directors shall have power to fill it. It has been held that this provision is an implied
io. See Mexican Ore Co. v. Mexican Co., 47 Fed. 351, 356 (C. C. D. N. J. i8gi) ; Wickersham v. Crittenden, 93 Cal. 17, 28 Pac. 788 (1892) ; St. Bernard Trappers' Association v.
Michel, 162 La. 366, iO So. 617 (1926) ; Brown v. Clow, 158 Ind. 403, 62 N. E. ioo6 (19o2) ;
Bruce v. Platt, 8o N. Y. 379, 382 (i88o) ; Sturgis v. Crescent Jute Co., 57 Hun. 587, aff'g IO
N. Y. Supp. 322 (Ist Dep't 18go).
ii. Barde v. Portland News Co., 145 Ore. 376, 26 P. (2d) 787, 792 (1923).
12. Ebaugh v. Hendel, 5 Watts 43 (Pa. 1836).
13. 2 TnomPsoN, CoRPoRATIoxs (3d ed. 1927) § 1191; (193o) 64 U. S. L. REv. 351, 354.
14. Continental Co. v. Voight, lo6 Fed. 550 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. igoo); Sinclair v. Fuller,
158 N. Y. 6o7, 53 N. E. 510 (1896), aff'g 41 N. Y. Supp. 193 (1896) ; Sturgis v. Crescent
Jute Co., 57 Hun. 587, aff'g io N. Y. Supp. 470 (Ist Dep't 189o) ; Bruce v. Platt, 8o N. Y.
379 (88o).
15. Sturgis v. Crescent Jute Co., 57 Hun. 587, aff'g io N. Y. Supp. 47o (Ist Dep't 189o);
Continental Co. v. Voight Co., io6 Fed. 550 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 39oo).
I6. Sinclair v. Fuller, 158 N. Y. 607, 53 N. E. 510 (1896), aff'g 41 N. Y. Supp. 193
(4th Dep't 1896).
17. Roberts v. Stanton Co., 49 Wash. 23, 94 Pac. 647 (igos).
18. People v. N. Y. Motor Co., 7o Misc. 603 (N. Y. 19II).
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reiteration of the already existing privilege of resigning. 19 The second is the
statutory provision to the effect that the board of directors shall at all times consist of at least a given number of directors, usually three. Such a requirement
has been held not to hinder a director's right to resign even though the
20 board
of directors, prior to his resignation, contains only the minimum number.
A third provision is a common one found in the by-laws of most corporations, requiring that directors (or officers) shall hold office for a year and until
successors are elected and have qualified. The prevailing authority is to the effect
that the purpose and meaning of this provision in regard to the term of office is
to make it conform to the time of the new election and not absolutely to require
every director (or officer) to serve the full term. In other words, such provision is generally supposed to be declaratory of the common law rule that directors hold over after the expiration of their original term in the event of nonelection or disqualification of successors, and in nowise affects their right to resign
during the year. 21 On the other hand, it has been held that such a provision is
meant for the protection of the public; that so far as the public, and particularly
those who deal with the corporation, are concerned, a resignation tendered before
the election of his successor, and not acted upon by the corporation, has no effect.22
The thought appears to be that a by-law has the force of a statute, and that therefore the public and the corporation creditors have the right to continue to regard
the official22who has tendered his resignation as being in office until his successor
is elected..
The weakness of this argument lies in the fact that the by-laws of a private
corporation are not usually available to the public or even to the creditors of the
corporation. By-laws are, in effect, agreements entered into by the shareholders
among themselves, and are merely intended for the purposes of internal regulation of corporate affairs. It is generally considered that creditors are not charged
with notice of the contents of by-laws. 24 In all four cases holding that the
presence of such a by-law rendered the resignation ineffective,2°- moreover, there
are circumstances which tend to mitigate the force of the decisions. In the
leading case of Timolat v. Held, and in ColoradoDebenture Co. v. Lombard Co.,
the facts strongly indicated that because of the "resignations" involved, it became
extremely inconvenient to find a corporate official upon whom service might
have been made. The courts were, therefore, unwilling to accept the argument of
the defendants that there was lack of jurisdiction as a result of improper service
of process, where the claims of the plaintiff creditors were clearly valid. In
Ross v. Western Land Co., the court was somewhat persuaded by the authority
of Timolat v. Held, and in addition was not at all convinced that the facts revealed a resignation in the first place. In Venner v. Denver Co., although the
court made the language of the Held case one basis for its conclusion, it specifically pointed out that although the officer in question had resigned, he had coni. Squires v. Brown,

22 How. Pr. 35 (N. Y. 186o).
2o. Dodge v. Kenwood Ice Co., 204 Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913); Porter v. Lassen
County Co., 127 Cal. 261, 59 Pac. 563 (1899) ; Castle v. Lewis, 78 N. Y. 131 (1879) ; Wilson
v. Brentwood Hotel Co., 16 Misc. 48 (N. Y. 1896).
(C. C. A.
21. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132 (18i); Fearing v. Glenn, 73 Fed. I6
2d, 1896) ; Security Co. v. Superior Ct., 281 Pac. 709 (Cal. 1929) ; Evarts v. Killingsworth,
20 Conn. 447 (185o) ; Western Co. v. American Co., 175 Wis. 493, 185 N. W. 535 (921).
22. Ross v. Western Land Co., 223 Fed. 68o (S. D. Iowa 1915).
23. Timolat v. Held, 7 Misc. 556 (N. Y. 1896).
24. Newton v. Johnson Organ Co., i8o Cal. 185, i8o Pac. 7 (1919) ; Metropole Co. v.
Garden City Co., 50 Ill. App. 681 (1893).
25. Ross v. Western Land Co., 223 Fed. 68o (S. D. Iowa 1915) ; Venner v. Denver Co.,
40 Coo. 212, 90 Pac. 623 (907) ; Colorado Debenture Co. v. Lombard Co., 66 Kans. 251, 71
Pac. 584 (19o3) ; Timolat v. Held, 17 Misc. 556 (N. Y. 1896).
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tinued thereafter with his official duties just as though no resignation had taken
place. It will be subsequently shown that it has more than once been held that at
least so far as the public is concerned, a person who continues his duties after
resigning may be deemed still to hold his official position.
D. Attempt at Resignation by All the Corporate Officers and Directors
An interesting problem is presented when all the corporate officers and
directors tender their resignations at the same time.2
A situation of this sort
does not of course arise as a mere coincidence. Where such an "omnibus resignation" has been attempted, the corporate officials have had one or more of three
objectives in mind: to dissolve the corporation; to place the corporation in a
position where a receiver would have to be appointed to care for the assets; to
prevent creditors with presently existing claims from obtaining access to the
corporate assets.
It has long been settled that a corporation is not dissolved when its officials
assign away all the assets, and resign en masse, even though the shareholders
consent that the corporation shall thereby be terminated. 27 However, no reason
appears why the resignation itself should not be valid, provided there are no
creditors remaining. Where, however, creditors do remain, it has logically been
held that the attempted resignation was ineffective
at least to prevent service of
2
process on any of the "resigned" officials.

Where the corporation is legally solvent but perilously neai insolvency and
in need of all of its assets, corporate officials have at times attempted to thwart
pressing creditors through the means of an omnibus resignation, the desired effect
being that there shall be no officials upon whom service can validly be made.
Obviously, however, such resignations are not meant as a permanent severing
of corporate connections, and have consequently been held to be presumptively
fraudulent. 29 In this situation, then, corporate officials have no privilege of
resigning en masse.30 Two cases purport to hold the other way.3 1 Both are
New York lower court decisions, the one decided before, the other at the same
time as the appellate court decision in Zeitner v. Zeltner Co., 32 and are effectually

overruled by the latter.
There are statutes providing for the appointment of a receiver where the
corporation has no officer within the state qualified to administer the corporate
property. Sometimes corporations have attempted to bring themselves within
the scope of this statute by an omnibus resignation of its corporate officials. In
a state of law wherein no other method of proceeding in insolvency presents itself,
such action by the corporate officials has been sanctioned. 3 Such a resignation
ought not to be tolerated, however, when the state in question provides other adequate insolvency or receivership procedure, since the corporate assets assigned to
the care of the corporate officials are left without protection between the time of
the resignation and the appointment of the receiver. The leading case of Zeltner
v. Zeltner Co. has expressly repudiated the right to resign under such circumstances.
26. Such a resignation does not dissolve the corporation. Evarts v. Killingworth Co., 2o
Conn. 447, 458 (850) ; Muscatine Turn Verein v. Funck, 18 Iowa 469, 472 (1865).
27. Evarts v. Killingworth Co., 2o Conn. 447 (1850) ; Rorke v. Thomas, 56 N. Y. 559,
563 (1874).
28. Evarts v. Killingworth Co., 2o Conn. 447 (1850).
29. Zeltner v. Zeltner Brewing Co., 174 N. Y. 247, 66 N. E. 81o (19o3).
3o. Ibid.

31. Wilson v. Brentwood Hotel Co., 16 Misc. 48 (N. Y. 1896) ; Yorkville Bank v. Zeltner Brewing Co., 8o App. Div. 578, 8o N. Y. Supp. 839 (Ist Dep't 1903).
32. 174 N. Y. 247, 66 N. E. 8io (19o3).
33. Smith v. Danzig, 64 How. Pr. 320 (N. Y. 1883).

NOTES
One other situation has presented itself. Where all the directors were improperly elected, and any action by them would have meant a violation of a court
order not yet presented to them, it was held that they had the right to resign
en nasse from their "de facto" status.3 4
E. Agreements to Resign for Pecuniary Consideration
The statement has been made 35 and reiterated 38 that an agreement to resign
as a corporate officer or director for pecuniary consideration is void as against
public policy. Normally, it may be admitted, such a transaction will be regarded
as illegal. The reason for this is the tendency occasioned by such agreement to
defeat the purposes of the corporation and the interests of its shareholders. The
corporate officers and directors hold positions of trust. One of the shareholders'
most fundamental and important powers is the power to elect directors. It is
true that for the sake of convenience, the board of directors is usually empowered
to fill vacancies occasioned between elections. For the directors, however, to
abuse this privilege by seeking to create vacancies by "resignations" acquired for
consideration, is a practice clearly to be frowned upon. Similarly, for an officer
to resign "in favor of another" is equally unfair to the shareholders. The resigning official has not, therefore, an ordinarily enforcible claim to the consideration for which he has contracted.37 It does not follow, however, that the agreement should affect the privilege of resigning. If the official should resign in order
to carry out his part of the agreement it appears fairly certain that he would not
be able to have himself reinstated because of the illegality of his agreement. Calling such a contract "void", therefore, does not completely present the picture.
These agreements are not always invalid, however. Where clearly for the
benefit of the corporation, they have been upheld. Thus, where a party advanced
money absolutely necessary for working capital, and demanded in return that he
be elected president, it was held proper for the directors to secure the resignation
of the then president for consideration given him.'
Likewise, where the board
of directors were unable to agree upon any course of action, and there were
continual disputes, it was held to be in the interest of the corporation for the
remainder of the board of directors to contract for the resignation of one of their
number.3 9
II. Methods by Which Resignation Is Effected; FormalitiesAttendant Thereon
A. Resignation by Words
Assuming the existence of the privilege of resigning, and a desire on the
part of a director or officer to exercise that privilege, the method by which he
may resign becomes of importance. Ordinarily, such an officer or director should
express his desire in a formal manner so that new directors may be electel. It
has already been noted, however, that one may resign by words or by acts, and
a resignation shown by acts is normally not particularly formal. That which
is most fundamental therefore, in either situation, is that there be a positive and
unequivocal declaration to the corporation of an intention to resign at once.40
Loose talk,4 ' a threat to resign,42 an expression of intention to resign in the
34. Ehret v. Ringler, 70 Misc. 627 (N. Y. 1911).
35. Forbes v. McDonald, 54 Cal. 98 (i88o) ; Holt v. Cal. Development Co., 161 Fed. 3
(C. C. A. 9th, i9o8).
36. Fr-rcHER, CYcLoPEDIA ConRoRATIoNs (perm. ed. 193) § 348; 2 THompsoN, CoRPoRATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 1191.
37. Ibid.
38. Joseph v. Raft, 82 App. Div. 47, 81 N. Y. Supp. 546 (Ist Dep't i9O3).
39. Anderson Co. v. Pungs, 127 Mich. 543, 86 N. W. 1O4O (igoi).
4o. Brias v. Hood, 24 Philippine Rep. 286 (913).
41. Ross v. Western Land Co., 223 Fed. 68o (S. D. Iowa 1925).
42. Union Nat'l Bank v. Scott, 53 App. Div. 66, 66 N. Y. Supp. 245 (3d Dep't i9oo).
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future 0-all are insufficient. An expression of belief that one's office is vacant
is not enough. 44 A statement by a director that he is withdrawing from a particular meeting is insufficient, 45 as is a statement made in anger by one director to
the remainder of the board that he will have nothing more to do with the office.4

-

The circumstances must also show that the intention to discontinue the
official connection is expressed in good faith. 47
Although for purposes of proof a written resignation is to be preferred, an
oral resignation is sufficient. 48 Nor will the mere fact that the resignation is oral
create a presumption of fraud.49 A statute, charter or by-law may of course call
for a written resignation. 0 Such a provision, however, is not always regarded
as exclusive. It has been held to leave the way open for mutual agreement between the parties as to other methods of resignation.5 Thus, where a director
tendered an oral resignation
which was accepted by the board of directors, it
52
was regarded as sufficient.

It has already been noted that the privilege of resigning is absolute and does
not depend on consent of the corporation manifested in the form of an acceptance. One case, however, involved a contradiction in terms, the court stating
that the privilege of resigning was absolute, but that acceptance was nevertheless
required. 53 To the extent that the corporation withholds its acceptance, under
that view, the privilege of resigning is limited. Acceptance should be unnecessary even as a formality. Similarly, the cases hold that the effectiveness of the
resignation is not limited by the fact of its not being recorded on the minutes, nor
is it ineffective until a successor is elected to fill the vacancy thereby created. 54
Although actual appointment of a successor is not required for an effective
resignation, it is nevertheless a sine qua non that the resignation be communicated to the corporation so that it may be in a position to elect or appoint a successor. It is usually understood that the board of directors is the proper agency
to which resignations may be addressed. 55 At least one valid reason for this is
the fact that normally it is the board of directors which is designated to fill
vacancies created by resignation or otherwise. One English case has held that
since the English Companies Act did not provide for vacation of office by resignation, the board of directors were not the parties to fill a vacancy thus created;
that therefore notice of resignation should have been communicated to the shareholders directly. 56 Aside from the statutory provision, the inconvenience of
addressing a resignation to the shareholders is evident. The shareholders normally meet only once a year. To send the shareholders notice individually is
clearly unreasonable. This case has been substantially overruled by two later
43. Ross v. Western Land Co., 223 Fed. 68o (S. D. Iowa 1915).
44. Berry v. Cross, 3 Sandford Ch. I (1845).
45. Brias v. Hood, 24 Philippine Rep. 286 (1913).
46. Ibid.
47. Millsaps v. Chapman, 76 Miss. 942, 26 So. 369 (i899).
48. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. X32 (1891) ; Fearing v. Glen, 73 Fed. 116 (C. C. A.
2d, 1896) ; Kisner's Estate, 254 Pa. 597, 9g Atl. 168 (1916).
49. Jackson v. Clifford, 5 D. C. App. (1895).
5o. Goodrich Rubber Co. v. Helena Motor Co., 53 Mont. 526, 165 Pac. 454 (1917).

51. Iid.
Latchford Premier Cinema v. Ennion, [1931] 2 Ch. 409.
53. Savannah Cotton Mills v. Cunningham, ioo Ga. 468, 28 S. E. 435 (1897).
54. Brias v. Hood, 24 Philippine Rep. 286 (1913) ; Sturges v. Vanderbilt, 73 N. Y. 384
(1878) ; Security Co. v. Superior Ct., 281 Pac. 709 (Cal. 1929).
55. See Movius v. Lee, 30 Fed. 298, 301 (E. D. N. Y. 1887); Municipal Freehold Co.
v. Pollington, (1890) 59 L. J. Ch. (N. s.) 734, 735.
56. Municipal Freehold v. Pollington, (189o) 59 L. J. Ch. (Ni. s.) 734.
52.
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communication to the board of directors was tacitly
English cases in which
7
regarded as sufficient.
Numerous cases have held that a resignation 9addressed to the president of
5
the corporation, 5 s or to the chairman of the board, is also sufficient. Such decihold such a position of
officers
these
that
theory
the
by
sions are supported
general authority that notice to them will be notice to the board of directors; that
it must be within their authority to receive it even though neither personally fills
the vacancy created. Likewise, a resignation addressed to the secretary of a corporation when that secretary was the most important functionary in the corporation was held to be sufficient 6 0 However, it has been held that notice communieven
cated to the ordinary secretary of a corporation was improper notification
6
though the particular individual was also treasurer of the corporation. ' Similarly, a resignation addressed to an individual director has failed to complete the
resignation. 2 It would seem that the secretary even in the normal situation
should be qualified to receive such notice. All correspondence addressed to the
corporation or its board of directors commonly goes through his hands. Likewise,
a notification to an individual director should be sufficient. While he does not
fill the vacancy himself, he at least partakes therein. In both of the cases cited,
the decision was undoubtedly affected by the fact that the resignations involved
were oral. Obviously, statutory or corporate provision may affect the result. It
08
has been provided that a resignation addressed to a director or to the secretary 64 is sufficient.
Two cases have held that the resignation need not be communicated to the
public or to creditors of the corporation.6 5 It has been held in a third case,
however, that a by-law provision to the effect that a director shall hold office until
his successor was elected was sufficient to prevent the resignation from becoming
effective at least as against a member of the public who thereafter served process
on the party who had "resigned", the public not having been informed of the
resignation. 6 Since by-laws are not intended for the benefit of the public, however, the decision seems incorrect.
The point in time at which the resignation takes effect warrants some discussion. A few conclusions are fairly apparent. A resignation, whether oral or
written, certainly does not take effect at a date later than when it is actually
brought to the attention of the proper officials. A question arises, however, when
a letter of resignation is sent through the mail. Unfortunately, this exact issue
has been raised only once, and then the court deemed it unnecessary to determine it because of the fact that the letterof resignation was addressed to what
the court at the time regarded as an improper agency.67 The only authority
available is in five or six scattered dicta, and these reach various conclusions.
One of these has said that the resignation takes effect on the date when written 68 ;
57. Latchford Premier Cinema v. Ennion, [i93i] 2 Ch. 409; Glossop v. Glossop, [i9o7]
2 Ch. 370.
58. Briggs v. Spaulding, IW U. S. 132 (i89i) ; Movius v. Lee, 30 Fed. 298 (E. D. N. Y.

1887) ; International Bank of St. Louis v. Faber, 86 Fed. 443 (C. C. A. 2d, 1898) ; Wilson
v. Brentwood Hotel Co., 16 Misc. 48 (N. Y. 1896).
59. See In re Gloucester, 4 De G. M. & G. 769, 776 (Eng. 1853).
6o. Finche v. Oakes, [i896] I Ch. 409.
6i. Chemical Nat'l Bank v. Colwell, 132 N. Y. 250, 30 Atl. 664 (1897).
62. Kindberg v. Mudgett, 09 N. Y. 653, i6 N. E. 683 (1888).
63. Berry v. Coss, 3 Sandf. Ch. 1 (1845).
64. People v. N. Y. Motor Co., 7o Misc. 6o3 (N. Y. i9I).
65. Security Co. v. Superior Ct., 281 Pac. 709 (Cal. i929) ; Bruce v. Platt, 8o N. Y. 379

(188o).
66. Venner v. Denver Co., 40 Coo. 212, go Pac. 623 (19o7).
67. Municipal Freehold v. Pollington, (1890) 59 L. J. Ch.
68. See Bruce v. Platt, 8o N. Y. 379, 383 (i88o).
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two, as soon as mailed '9; two English cases, when it came before the board of
directors 70; and a sixth, "whien tendered to the proper authorities". 71 The last
may be ruled out as too ambiguous. Since a letter may be retained after it is
written and before it is mailed, the first also should be disregarded. As regards
those deeming mere mailing as sufficient, the analogy to the acceptance of a contract by mailing does not seem conclusive. The postal authorities are certainly
not the agents of the corporation. Since a primary consideration in all resignation formalities is that the corporation be made aware of the resignation so that
it may immediately appoint a successor, the result of the English dicta seems
logical.
Since a director or an officer has a privilege of resigning at will, it is perfectly consistent to hold that such official may manifest an intention to continue
his status but only up to and until the occurrence of a designated condition or
event.72 For example, a resignation "to take effect on acceptance" is not completed until accepted.7 3 This condition is deemed sufficiently complied with, however, if the board, functioning regularly, acts to fill the vacancy thereby
occasioned.7 4 Although the word "tender" is often regarded as meaning "offer",
a tender of resignation is not an offer of resignation conditioned
upon acceptance.
75
It is rather a declaration of immediate intention to resign.
Before the happening of the condition, however, the official in question may
continue to do everything he had the power and privilege of doing before, and
such acts are binding on the corporation.76 It would appear he should also be
able to withdraw the resignation at any time prior to the occurrence of the
condition. One English case has held, however, that where a by-law provides that
the board should be given six months within which to accept a resignation, an
officer once having tendered his resignation could not withdraw it even though
the board had not as yet accepted it.
Due to the peculiar wording of the bylaw, the decision should be restricted to its facts.
The case of Savannah Mills v. Cunninghanm 78 presents an interesting situa-

tion. Here, the board of directors, meeting in June, resolved that the date of the
annual shareholders' meeting should be changed from October to January; that
at the October meeting next following the shareholders should elect officials who
would serve only to January, at which time a new election should be held. No
meeting of the shareholders was held in October. Plaintiff, who was a director,
treasurer and general manager of the corporation continued in office. In November, his resignation was requested by the board. Plaintiff tendered a resignation
conditional on payment to him of salary as treasurer and general manager to
January. The board accepted his resignation but refused to vote or pay him the
additional salary. The court held the resignation complete on its tender, and
that plaintiff had no right to the salary in question. The result is difficult to
69. See Security Co. v. Superior Ct., 281 Pac. 709, 710 (Cal. 1929) ; Lord v. Endicott
Johnson Corp., 231 App. Div. I, 3, 246 N. Y. Supp. 377, 379 (3d Dep't 193o).
70. See Finche v. Oakes, [1896] I Ch. 409, 415; Municipal Freehold v. Pollington, (i8go)
59 L. J. Ch. (x. s.) 743, 745.
71. See Nix v. Miller, 26 Colo. 203, 209, 57 Pac. 1084, 1087 (1899).
72. Blake v. Wheeler, 18 Hun. 469 (N. Y. 1879).
73. Seal of Gold Mining Co. v. Slater, 161 Cal. 621, 120 Pac. 15 (1911); Lincoln Ct.
Realty Co. v. Kentucky Bank Co., 169 Ky. 840, 185 S. W. 156 (1916).
74. It re Chelsea Exchange Co., 18 Del. Ch. 287, 159 Atl. 432 (1932).
75. People v. N. Y. Motor Co., 70 Misc. 6o3 (N. Y. 1911); Manhattan Co. v. Kaldenburg, 165 N. Y. 1, 58 Atl. 790 019oo).
76. Vaught v. Charleston Nat'l Bank, 62 F. (2d) 817 (C. C. A. ioth, 1933).
77. Glossop v. Glossop, [1907] 2 Ch. 370.
78. IOO Ga. 468, 28 S. E. 435 (1897).
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understand. Assuming that he was not entitled to the salary, the plaintiff had
still the right to attach a condition to his resignation. The condition not having
been complied with, it seems to follow that the resignation was not effected.
B. Resignation Manifested by Acts; Abandonment
Somewhat different considerations attach to resignations to be gathered from
the acts of the individual in question. In at least one respect, however, there
is similarity to a resignation expressed by words. The actions must lead to a
clear inference that the director or officer in question intends to resign, and that
the corporation will be justified in choosing his successor. 79
The paucity of case authority makes generalizations as to what facts will be
sufficient manifestation of the intention necessarily dangerous. Some tendencies
may nevertheless be observed. Abandonment and neglect of duties are obviously
factors to be considered. The strength of these indicia is, however, qualified by
the type and extent of the functions which the incumbent is to perform. Thus,
a director who neglected to attend the monthly meeting of the board of directors
from January to April was held not to have shown an intent to resign.8 0 On the
other hand, a secretary whose duties continued from day to day was held to
have resigned by complete neglect for a period of one month. 8 A director,
however, who was also an officer, was regarded as having abandoned both of his
positions by neglect to perform them for a period of ten months.8 2 And where
directors had abandoned all duties for a period of some years, there being
no
83
election of new directors during that time, they were held to have resigned.
In the year 1838 a removal from the state of incorporation, where also the
business was done, was held to show the intent to resign.8 4 Obviously, the
importance of this factor would be negligible today. Removal from the country,
on the other hand, is certainly an indication of intent to abandon.the duties.8 5
At common law, a director or officer is not required to hold shares in his
corporation to be qualified for office. Consequently, a sale of his shares *will
not amount to a disqualification.86 Neither does it necessarily show an intention
to abandon the position. 7 However, a sale of stock in accordance with an agreement entered into with three members of the board of directors that the sale
should amount to a resignation was regarded as an implied resignation of office."8
Where a statute, charter, or by-law requires that an official hold shares (so
as to maintain his interest in the corporation) a sale by such official amounts to a
disqualification. 9 The numerous variant problems which arise from this and
other modes of disqualification do not come within the scope of this note.
The statement has been made and adopted by text-writers that an acceptance
of a position in the corporation incompatible with the one already held by the
director or officer in question amounts to an implied resignation of the latter.90
All the illustrations, however, invariably involve municipal corporations. Although there is no reason to doubt that the courts would apply the same rules to
79. Sturges v. Vanderbilt, 73 N. Y. 384 (1878).
8o. Halpin v. Mutual Brewing Co., 20 App. Div. 583, 47 N. Y. Supp. 412 (2d Dep't 1897).
81. Birmingham Realty Co. v. Hale, 16 Ala. App. 460, 78 So. 723 (1918).
82. Dodge v. Kenwood Ice Co., 204 Fed. 577 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913).
83. Bartholemew v. Bentley, i Ohio St. 37 (1852).
84. State of Ohio v. Thomas Bryce, 7 Ohio 414 (1836).
85. Wilson v. Wilson, 6 Scott 540 (Eng. 1838).
86. Buffalo Electro-Plating Co. v. Day, 151 App. Div. 237, 135 N. Y. Supp. 1054 (4th
Dep't 1912).
87. Nathan v. Thompkins, 182 Ala. 437 (1886).
88. Anderson Co. v. Pungs, 127 Mich. 543, 86 N. W. 1O4O (igoi).
89. Chemical Nat'l Bank v. Colwell, 132 N. Y. 250, 3o Atl. 664 (1897) ; Sturges v. Vanderbilt, 73 N. Y. 384 (1878).
9o. 2 THoMPsoN, CoRuoRATIoNs (3d ed. 1927) § 1194; (I93O) 64 U. S. L. REV. 351.
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private corporations, no cases involving the latter have appeared. It has, however, been held that the appointment and acceptance of a receivership of a corporation by one who was its director and president, is not a resignation of the latter
positions."' Acceptance by a group of professors of professorships in another
university in the same locality was held not to amount to a resignation of the
former positions. 92 A trustee of a church who joined a church of another
denomination was regarded as having surrendered his position as trustee.93
Acceptance of an engineering position in China was held to be incompatible with
holding the position of director in a corporation in the Philippine Islands.9 4
A request by all the directors, who had been improperly elected, that the
court appoint a receiver, where a statute provided that a receiver might be
appointed if no official was present in the state to hold the corporate property,
was held to amount to a resignation. 95 On the other hand, voting for seven
directors, instead of one, in the belief that a vacancy as to one created a vacancy
as to all, was held not to show a sufficient intent to resign. 96
Although neglect of duty may be insufficient to amount to resignation, it has
been held that it may also
be insufficient to show an acceptance on subsequent
97
re-election to that office.
III. Proof of Resignation
Where that which is alleged to be the resignation is in writing, whether the
writing is sufficient to amount to resignation is for the court's determination."
Where oral words are proffered and there is no conflict as to what those words
are, it should also be for the court to decide. Where, however, the words, oral
or written, or the acts in question, are ambiguous, or the evidence as to the
existence of the words and acts is conflicting, the fact of resignation becomes a
jury question. 9
IV. Effect of Resignation
A. In General
A valid resignation entirely severs the relation of the former director or
officer to the corporation as far as the resigned position is concerned. Once the
resignation is completely effected, the director or officer may not thereafter of his
own volition withdraw that resignation. 00 Nor, it is evident, can he be compelled by the corporation to withdraw it,'0 ' even if his presence is necessary to
constitute a quorum. It has, however, been stated by way of dictum that the
resignation may be withdrawn with the consent of the board of directors. 0 2 This
conclusion seems sensible. Since the board is the normal functionary to fill
vacancies created by resignation, no reason appears why they may not reinstate
the resigned official instead of going through the procedure of reappointing him.
Nor has an officer or director who has validly resigned the privilege of continuing with the ordinary duties of the office over the protest of his successor or
gi. Venner v. Denver Co., 40 Colo.

212, 9o Pac. 623 (1907).
University of Md. v. Williams, 9 Gill & 3. 365 (Md. 1838).
93. Ross v. Crocket, 14 La. Ann. 811 (1859).
94. Mead v. McCullough, 21 Philippine Rep. 95 (191).
95. Ehret v. Ringler, 70 Misc. 627 (N. Y. 1911).
96. Berry v. Cross, 3 Sandf. Ch. I (1845).
97. Zimmerman v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 121 Ark. 408, 181 S. W. 283 (1917), Ann. Cas.
1917D 513. Cf. Halpin v. Mutual Brewing Co., 20 App. Div. 583, 47 N. Y. Supp. 412 (2d
Dep't 1897).
98. Bruce v. Platt, 8o N. Y. 379 (1880).
99. Fearing v. Glen, 73 Fed. 116 (C. C. A. 2d, 1896) ; Mott Iron Works v. West Coast Co.,
131 Cal. 341, 45 Pac. 683 (1896) ; Venner v. Denver Co., 40 Coo. 212, 9o Pac. 623 (19o7);
Manhattan v. Kaldenburg, 165 N. Y. 1, 58 Atl. 79o (igoo).
oo. People v. N. Y. Motor Co., 70 Misc. 6o3 (N. Y. 1911) ; Finche v. Oakes, [1896] I
Ch. 4o9; Sorrentino v. Ciletti, 75 App. Div. 507, 78 N. Y. Supp. 322 (1st Dep't 1902).
ioi. Manhattan v. Kaldenburg, 165 N. Y. 1, 58 Atl. 790 (9oo).
io2.
See Glossop v. Glossop, [1907] 2 Ch. 370, 373.
92.
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of the corporation. 10 3 Nor may such director validly fill vacancies created in the
board. 04 Similarly, his presence cannot be counted in determining the existence
of a quorum. 05
However, by acquiescing in the board's refusal to accept his resignation
which he had intended as being presently effective and not conditioned on acceptance, and thereafter continuing to perform the duties of the office, a resigned
official was in at least one case held to have been effectually reinstated. 0 8 And
one who, with or without consent, continues to perform the .normal duties of
the office, may render himself liable as for directorial negligence. 07 One who
had resigned as a director, however, but continued to act merely as manager and
agent, was not held personally liable as a negligent director. 08
If the relationship is severed, it is apparent that a resigned director will not
be liable for the negligence or fraud of the remaining directors occurring subsequent to the resignation. 0 9 Thus, a resigned director has been held not liable
for subsequent payment by the other directors of illegal dividends, even though
no successor had been appointed, and no notice of his resignation had been given
the shareholders. Furthermore, he was aware of the fact that subsequent to his
resignation, the annual report upon the basis of which the dividends were paid,
had been drawn up including his name as a sanctioning director." 0 A director,
however, who endorsed a note together with the remaining directors of the
corporation subsequent to his resignation, was made to pay on it even though no
notice of dishonor by the corporation had been communicated to him."'
A director will be liable for negligence or fraud occurring prior to the resignation even though resulting in losses which occur subsequent to the resignation,
and even though the losses are as to creditors who become such subsequent to
resignation. 1 2 Where a statute requiring an annual directors' report is involved,
a resignation after a failure to file the report will result in liability for all debts
incurred before the resignation, but not for debts accruing thereafter." 3
Like a director, an officer may render himself liable either to the corporation
or to its shareholders, for breach of duty while in office, regardless of whether the
damage occurred before or after the resignation." 4
B. Effect of Resignation on Service of Process
Once the resignation is validly effected, one cannot obtain jurisdiction over
the corporation by serving process on the resigned official, regardless of notice of
the resignation."15 This is true, as has already been noted, even though a by-law
of the corporation provides that the official in question shall hold office until a
successor is appointed. One case has, however, held that where such a provision exists, though the resignation may be effective as between the corporation
1O3. Sorrentino v. Ciletti, 75 App. Div. 507, 78 N. Y. Supp. 322 (Ist Dep't 1902) ; Latchford Premier Cinema v. Ennion, [1931] 2 Ch. 4o9.
1O4. Bartholemew v. Bentley, i Ohio St. 37 (1852) ; Wickersham v. Crittenden, 93 Cal.
17,28 Pac. 788 (0892).
105. Snyder v. Bender, 173 N. Y. Supp. 401 (1919).
io6. Re Guanecevi Tunnel Co., 201 Fed. 316 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912).
lo7. Benedum v. Citizens Bank, 72 W. Va. 124, 78 S. E. 656 (1912).
io8. Brown v. Clow, 158 Ind. 4o3, 63 N. E. ioo6 (19o2).
1o9. Briggs v. Spaulding, 14r U. S. 132 (1891); Nix v. Miller, 26 Colo. 203, 57 Pac.
1o84 (1899) - Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown, 271 Mass. 132, 171 N. E. 42 (193o).
1IO. In re National Bank, [1899] 2 Ch. 629.
iii. Steffens v. Sinkey, 43 Ohio App. 355, 183 N. E. 288 (1932).
112. Dennis v. Thomson, 240 Ky. 727, 43 S. W. (2d) 18 (1931); see also Nix v. Miller,
26 Colo. 203, 208, 57 Pac. 1084, o85 (899).
113. Bruce v. Platt, 8o N. Y. 379 (1880).
114. Chicago Flexotile Co. v. Lane, 247 N. W. 517 (Minn. 1933); Osborn v. Gilliams, 65
App. Div. 614, 74 N. Y. Supp. 623 (Ist Dep't 19O1).
115. Fearing v. Glen, 73 Fed. 116 (C. C. A. 2d, 1896) ; Security Co. v. Superior Ct., 281
Pac. 709 (Cal. 1929) ; Klopsch v. Atlas Co., 117 N. Y. Supp. 8o5 (19o9).
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and the individual official in question, nevertheless if the corporation fails thereafter to appoint a successor, creditors are entitled to obtain jurisdiction over the
negligent corporation by serving the resigned official. This case, Timolat v.
Held,"6 has been followed by Colorado Debenture Co. v. Lombard Co.17 It
has already been noted that such provision is not meant for the protection of
creditors or the general public; that by-laws are not normally regarded as affecting the public. Further, an officer who has completely severed his official connection with the corporation would be under no legal obligation to inform the
corporation of the service. The court in these two cases might well have adopted
other grounds for holding that jurisdiction had been properly obtained. In the
Held case, the resigned director was still the sole shareholder of the corporation;
the court had little to fear as regards the possibility of his not informing the
corporation of the service. In the Lombard case, a Kansas statute provided that
service be made on the chief officer (where local corporations were concerned),
and if he could not be found, on any inferior officer. Prior to service, all the
officials except the president and four directors had resigned. The president,
however, was living outside of the state, and no meetings of the board of directors had been held for three years. Service on the resigned assistant secretary
was held valid. It is evident that the resignations made service on an existing
officer almost impossible. In this connection, it has already been observed that
officers and directors may not resign en masse when the effect is to leave the
corporation without any officials upon whom creditors may validly serve process.
Similarly, a resignation by a single officer of a foreign corporation doing business
in New York has been held ineffective to prevent service of process on him when
the effect of the resignation was to leave only non-resident officials in the corporation. 18 The court in the Lombard case might well have deemed the resignations
ineffective simply because of its unfair effect on creditors. It was unnecessary
to adopt a strained interpretation of the successor clause.
Where a director resigns but thereafter continues to perform the duties of
the office, process served on him is valid as against the corporation." 9 The
same rule should apply to officers. Where, however, the president of a corporation resigned, and thereafter continued to deal with the corporation as a third
on commission, a service on him
party, loaning it money and selling its products
120
was held invalid as against the corporation.
C. Effect of Resignation on Status of Other Positions
No reason appears why an officer or a director who also holds other official
positions in the corporation may not resign one or more of those positions and
retain others. The cases agree. Thus, it has been held that a resignation of the
position of secretary and treasurer did not remove such person from the office of
director.1 1' Two cases have held that one who resigned as general manager
could still retain the position of director. 12 Conversely, 23it has been held that one
might resign as director, and still remain as a manager.
It has also been held that a resignation by a treasurer effected a removal
from office of an assistant treasurer who had been appointed by the treasurer. 2 4
116. I7 Misc. 556 (N. Y. x896).

117. 66 Kan. 251, 71 Pac. 584 (,9o3).
II8. Invention Corp. v. Hobbs, 244 Fed. 430 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
119. Colorado Debenture Co. v. Lombard Co., 66 Kan. 251, 71 Pac. 584 (1903) ; Mott
Iron Works v. West Coast Co., 131 Cal. 341, 45 Pac. 683 (1896).
2. Brown v. Clow, 158 Ind. 403, 63 N. E. ioo6 (19o2).
121. Noble v. Euler, 2o App. Div. 548, 47 N. Y. 302 (1897).
l22. Mead v. McCullough, 21 Philippine Rep. 95 (19i); Glossop v. Glossop, [1907] 2
Ch. 370.
123. Brown v. Clow, 158 Ind. 4o3, 63 N. E. ioo6 (19o2).
124. Emerson v. Fisher, 246 Fed. 642 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
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It has with similar purport been held that a resignation of a president removed
an attorney's authority to continue with a suit which the president had begun
on behalf of the corporation. 125 This case, at least, however, was affected by the
fact that the corporation itself subsequently decided to discontinue the suit.
D. Resignation as Affecting an Officer's Right to Salary
A director of a private corporation normally serves voluntarily, and without
receiving any technical consideration for his services. An officer, however, like
any employee, receives legal quid pro quo. Since he has a privilege of resigning
at will, the corporation may not refuse to pay him salary and other due compensation up until the date of the resignation. 2 8 He may not, however, demand
salary for the balance of the term during which he might have served, even
though the corporation has requested his resignation. 27 The theory here is
that the contract of employment, despite the preliminary request, was cancelled
by mutual consent. Such a resignation is not equivalent to a removal from office,
in which case the officer is usually entitled to the remaining salary. Likewise,
as regards abandonment of office, the right to salary ceases thereafter even
where the official's reason for resigning was threat
of bodily harm by the
28
president of the corporation if he continued to act.
An officer may validly make a condition of his resignation payment of salary
29
for the remainder of the term when his resignation has been requested.

It

has, however, been held that such a condition is invalid, and will not prevent the
present validity of the resignation, notwithstanding the resignation has been
requested, where the officer is merely holding over his regular term.3 0
Whether or not an officer who has effectively resigned but thereafter continues to perform the duties of the office, may claim salary either for the balance
of the term or in quantum meruit, has never been answered. It has, however,
been held that where an officer did acts not within the knowledge of the corporation, which acts disqualified him from holding office, he was not thereafter
entitled to salary either for the balance of the term or on quantum neruit for the
amount of work which he had actually done after the disqualification.' 3' The
theory here was that the corporation, being unaware of the disqualification, could
not have been presumed to have accepted his services. By analogy, the argument might be made that since a resignation is necessarily communicated to the
corporation, it will be presumed to have accepted, if not requested, the services
which are thereafter performed. The "de facto" officer would therefore be
entitled at least to recovery in quantum meruit.
The primary purpose of this treatment has been simply to set out with some
completeness the problems which may arise in connection with resignation, and
no general summary will be attempted. It might be suggested, however, by way
of conclusion, that statutory requirement of publicity for resignations of directors and officers is highly desirable. 32 This is particularly true as to large
corporations in which there is involved a considerable degree of public interest.
H.L.C.
125. St. Bernard Trappers' Ass'n v. Michel, 162 La. 366, iio So. 617 (1926).
126. See Anderson Co. v. Pungs, 127 Mich. 543, 545, 86 N. W. 1O4O, 1O41 (igoi).
127. Savannah Cotton Mills v. Cunningham, Ioo Ga. 468, 28 S. E. 435 (1897).
128. Roberts v. Stanton, 49 Wash. 23, 94 Pac. 647 (1909).
I29. See Savannah Cotton Mills v. Cunningham, Ioo Ga. 468, 470, 28 S. E. 435, 436

(1897).

130. Savannah Cotton Mills v. Cunningham, o Ga. 468, 28 S. E. 435 (1897).
131. In re Bodega Co., Ltd., [1904] I Ch. 276.
132. A regrettable result was reached in the case of Goodrich Rubber Co. v. Helena Motor Co., 53 Mont. 526, 165 Pac. 454 (1917). The state statute required publication of resignations in two consecutive issues of the official paper of the county in which the corporation did
business. It was held to be merely permissive, a written resignation directed to the board of
directors being sufficient without publication.

